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I. INTRODUCTION: PROPHETS AND POLICY 
On the day I began writing this paper, the Los Angeles Times reported 
that His Eminence Roger Cardinal Mahony created a stir when he devoted 
his Ash Wednesday homily to promoting a five-point program for immigra-
tion reform. 1 He urged his flock to ask the Lord to open their hearts to 
immigrants in the 2006 Lenten season: 
This Lenten season, join me in committing our Lenten practices 
to making room for the stranger in our midst, praying for the 
courage and strength to offer our spiritual and pastoral ministry to 
all who come to us, offering our prayer and support for the ones 
in our midst who, like Jesus, have no place to rest their heads (Mt 
8:20).2 
* John and Francis Duggan Chair of Business. and Professor of Economics, Pepperdine 
University, Malibu. California. 
1. Teresa Watanabe, Mahony's Lenten Message Irritates Some at Service, L.A. TIMEs, Mar. 
2,2006, at 3, available at 2006 WLNR 6961782. 
2. Cardinal Roger Mahony, Archbishop of L.A., 2006 Lenten Message: Making Room, Mar. 
1, 2006, http://www.archdiocese.lalnews/story.php?newsid=720. 
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Although the tone of his message was pastoral, the Archdiocesan press 
release that accompanied it was pointedly political: "In his annual Lenten 
Message, Cardinal Roger Mahony calls on all Catholics in the Archdiocese 
of Los Angeles to commit their Lenten practices of prayer, fasting and good 
works to immigration reform, 'especially in the face of increasing hostility 
toward immigrants.'''3 
The cardinal is not alone in putting his Episcopal weight behind a re-
form of the U.S. system. The U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops' 
(USCCB) website confIrms this political commitment.4 Specifically, the 
Migration and Refugee Services section contains all of the trappings of a 
public policy advocacy site.s For example, this section contains two public 
statements by bishops urging a policy of legalization for eleven million ille-
gal immigrants and urging opposition to immigration legislation passed by 
the House of Representatives last December.6 It contains background re-
ports on legalization, one claiming that "[l]egalization is a matter of justice" 
(including a list of political talking points), and another asserting the bish-
ops' collective support for the McCain-Kennedy reform bill and collective 
opposition to the Sensenbrenner-King legislation.7 It also contains sugges-
tions for homilists and liturgists to challenge parishioners to become advo-
cates for irnmigrants8 and suggestions for religious education programs-
complete with recommended children's books and a "cartoon contest in 
which the students illustrate unjust treatment of immigrants, migrants, or 
refugees throughout U.S. history."9 
The bishops' aggressive advocacy, both to the Catholic flock and in 
the political arena, is imprudent. By substituting their judgment for that of 
their flocks, on policy questions about which Catholics of goodwill can dis-
3. Cardiool Mahony Calls on Catholics to Fastfor Immigration Reform this Lenten Season, 
Feb. 28, 2006, http://www.archdiocese.laInewslstory.php?newsid=719. 
4. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops Home Page, http://www.usccb.org/ (last visited 
Mar. 28, 2007). 
5. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Migration & Refugee Services Home Page, http:// 
www.usccb.org/mrsl (last visited Mar. 28, 2007). 
6. Statement from Cardinal Justin Rigali on Immigration Reform, Jan. 9, 2006, http://www. 
archdiocese-phl.orglpressreleaseslprOOlOI3.htm; Statement of Most Reverend Gerald R. Barnes, 
Bishop of San Bernadino, California, Chariman, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops' Committee 
on Migration in Opposition to the Border Protection, Anti-Terrorism, and lllegallmmigration 
Control Act of 2005 (Dec. 14,2005), http://www.usccb.orglrnrslhr4437.shtml. 
7. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Migration & Refugee Services, Office of Migra-
tion & Refugee Policy, Legalization of Undocumented Immigrants, Nov. 2002, http://www.usccb. 
orglrnrsl1egal.shtml; U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Migration & Refugee Services, Office 
of Migration & Refugee Policy, Anti-terrorism Bill Said to Hinder Thousands of Refugee Appli-
cants, 2007, http://www.usccb.orglrnrs/mrp.shtml. 
8. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Migration & Refugee Services, Welcoming Christ 
in the Migrant: Prepare a Homily on "A Journey of Peace and Hope," Jan. 2007, http://www. 
usccb.orglmrs/nmwlhomily.shtml. 
9. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Migration & Refugee Services, Ideas for Schools, 
Religious Education, and Youth Programs, http://www.usccb.orglmrslyouth.shtml (last visited 
Jan. 27, 2007). 
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agree, the bishops appear to be overstepping their authority to teach Catho-
lic Social Teaching (CST). 
I make this claim, not because I find CST on immigration unhelpful-
on the contrary-it has become an indispensable moral framework for my 
thoughts on the subject. CST provides a set of first principles which I ac-
cept, partly on the authority of the bishops and partly on the power of those 
principles to illuminate the moral stakes in social policy. First principles are 
indispensable, and the bishops provide an important service in teaching 
them. My unease does not relate to my opinions about current immigration 
policy. Simply, the bishops are claiming an authority they do not have, and 
are thereby putting their authority on matters of faith and morals at risk, 
including their authority to teach the invaluable principles of CST. 
CST is a reflection on the implications of the Christian Gospel for the 
social order. According to the Catechism of the Catholic Church: "Christian 
revelation . . . promotes deeper understanding of the laws of social liv-
ing."lO As a result of reflection on the Christian revelation about humanity, 
the Catechism of the Catholic Church provides, "[t]he Church's social 
teaching proposes principles for reflection; it provides criteria for judgment; 
it gives guidelines for action."11 These principles, criteria, and guidelines 
have a claim on the conscience of Catholics, but they should not be applied 
to the particular environments in which policy is made. The virtue of pru-
dence is necessary to tum CST into policy. 
The Catechism of the Catholic Church defines prudence as "the virtue 
that disposes practical reason to discern our true good in every circumstance 
and to choose the right means of achieving it."12 Prudence is the virtue by 
which a person takes "the abstract good" and makes it real in concrete cir-
cumstances. In politics the exercise of prudence belongs primarily to the 
laity. According to Lumen Gentium, the laity are the primary agents of 
Christ's mission in secular affairs: "the laity, by their very vocation, seek 
the kingdom of God by engaging in temporal affairs and by ordering them 
according to the plan of God.,,13 When the bishops teach about which im-
migrant legislation is worthy of support, they encroach on the practice of 
prudence by the laity (assuming that the Episcopal charism-to proclaim 
the Gospel, to teach, and to shepherd the church-grants a special anointing 
to their prudential judgments about policy). This aggressive political agenda 
is founded on a misunderstanding of the nature of prudence; it is itself 
imprudent. 
10. Catechism of the Catholic Church: Modifications from the Editio Typica No. 2419 (2d 
ed., U.S. Catholic Coni. 1997) [hereinafter Catechism of the Catholic Church]. 
11. [d. at 2423. 
12. [d. at 1806. 
13. Documents of the Second Vatican Council, Lumen Gentium, No. 31, Nov. 21. 1964. 
available at http://www.vatican.valarchivelhist30uncilS/iL vatican_ counciVdocuments/vat-ii_ 
consC19641121_1umen-gentium3n.html. 
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There is much to sort out here. What do the bishops teach authorita-
tively? What is CST? What good are the general principles of CST if they 
are not applied? How are general principles turned into concrete goods? 
While the discussion of these questions often turns on disputed matters of 
ecclesiology and church authority, the crucial context of the discussion 
should be the Christian virtue of prudence. 
Section two outlines the principles of CST on immigration and ad-
dresses the common complaint that they are too general to be usefuL Sec-
tion three introduces prudence and highlights the requirements for the full 
exercise of prudence. Section four reviews the details of U.S. immigration 
in order to make clear the various goods at stake in the application of CST 
to U.S. immigration policy. In light of these requirements, section five 
makes the case that the prophetic approach of the bishops, while suited to 
point out dangers to human dignity, is ill-suited to the prudential decision-
making necessary to create a just and merciful immigration policy. 
II. CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING ON IMMIGRATION 
Man has the right to leave his native land for various mo-
tives-and also the right to return-in order to seek better 
conditions of life in another country. 14 
The principles of CST on immigration are not in dispute and are easy 
to summarize. First, there exists a right to migrate. Second, this right is not 
absolute; nations have a right to regulate migration. Third, the extent of the 
right to migrate should be detennined in light of the universal common 
good. 
The right to migrate is rooted in the clear command in scripture to 
welcome the stranger. 15 Immigrants are made in the image of God and have 
the same dignity as nonmigrants. Their right to migrate is similar to their 
right to property-persons have rights to those things that make possible 
their development as persons; migration and property are both important for 
the material provision of farnilies. 16 In Solicitudo Rei Socialis, John Paul II 
14. Pope John Paul II, Laborem Exercens, No. 23, Sept. 14, 1981. available at http://www. 
vatican. valholy jather/john_pauUi/encyclicalsidocuments/hfjp-ii_enc_14091981_laborem-ex-
ercens_en.html. 
15. Exodus 1:8-12; Leviticus 19:33-34. For an analysis of the rights context of U.S. immi-
gration policy, see DEBRA DELAET. U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY iN AN AGE OF RIGHTS (Praeger 
Publishers 2000). The 1965 Immigration Reform Act. which made possible the mass migration of 
the last forty years, should be understood as part of the Civil Rights movement of the sixties. It 
was an international counterpart to the Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act: just as all 
citizens were to be treated as equals before the law, regardless of race or creed, all those seeking 
to become citizens should be treated equally. 
16. Pope John XXIII, Mater et Magistra, No. 45, May 15, 1961, available at http://www. 
vatican. valholy _father/john_xxiii/encyclicalsidocumentslhfj-xxiii_enc _15051961_mater_en. 
html. 
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ties the right to migrate to the right to economic initiative, which is often 
abridged in home countries. 17 
Although the popes clearly assert a right to migrate, they frequently 
express concern about the effects of migration. Although the international 
migrant is clearly within his rights, the decision to migrate is regrettable 
because it puts the migrant at risk of losing his faith and in danger of being 
economically exploited. 18 CST frequently mentions the burdens of migra-
tion on the sending country. In Laborem Exercens, John Paul II emphasizes 
that emigration is a regrettable loss for the home country, which loses a 
subject who exercises creative agency in the society to which he migrates. 19 
The popes have frequently expressed the hope that the reform of the inter-
national economic system will make migration less frequent. 20 
Notwithstanding its solicitude for the plight of the migrant, the second 
principle of CST on immigration is that the right to migrate is not absolute. 
John Paul II's statement that "illegal immigration should be prevented," 
implies that states have a right to enforce restrictions on migration.21 John 
Paul II also stated that the right to migrate must be regulated in light of the 
burdens it imposes on the host country?2 When the migration is large and 
the migrants are from a different culture, the host country may "fear the loss 
of its identity.'>23 Large migrations may strain the resources of host coun-
tries, since "practicing [migration] indiscriminately may do harm and be 
detrimental to the common good of the community that receives the 
migrant. "24 
CST recognizes that immigration may put other human goods at risk in 
countries that receive large immigrations, and therefore these countries may 
17, Pope John Paul II, Sollicitudo rei Socialis, No. 15, Dec, 30. 1987, available at http:// 
www.vatican.va/holy _father!johnJ)auUiJencyclicals!documentslhfjp-ii_enc_30121987 _sollic-
itudo-rei-socialis_en,htrnl, 
18, 18. Paul VI. Populorum Progressio. March 26, 1967. '(67 available at http://www,vati-
can, va/holy jather/pauL vilencyclicalsldocumentslhCp-vi_enc_26031967 _populorum_en.html. 
19, Pope John Paul II. Laborem Exercens. supra note 14. at No. 23, 
20. Because CST regards migration as in some ways a regrettable right, it recommends a set 
of policies, which at the same time guarantee the right, yet seek to make it less likely that the right 
will be exercised. See Pope Paul VI. Octogesima Adveniens, No. 17, May 14, 1971, available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy jather/paul_ vilaposUettersldocumentslhCpvCapL1971 0514_ 
octogesima-adveniens_en,htrnl (Pope Paul VI urges an international agreement to guarantee the 
right of emigration); see also Pope John XXIII, Mater et Magistra, supra note 16, at No. 45 (Pope 
John XXIII points out that one of the benefits of international peace between countries is that it 
makes migration easier, helping to guarantee the right.), 
21. Pope John Paul II, Message for World Migration Day 1996, July 25, 1995, available at 
http://www.ewtn.com/libraryIPAPALDOCIJP950725.htm. 
22. Pope John Paul II, Message for World Migration Day 1993. 
23. Pope John Paul II, Message for World Migration Day, No, 1, Nov. 9, 1997, available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy jather/john_pauUi/messages/migrationldocumentslhfjp-iCmes_ 
09111997 _world-migration-day-19983n.html. 
24. Pope John Paul II, Message of the Holy Father for the 87th World Day of Migration 
2001, No.3, Feb. 2, 2001, available at http://www.vatican.va/holyjather/john_paul_iilmessages! 
migrationldocumentslhfjp-ii_mes_200 1 0213_ wOrld-migration-day-200 l_en.htrnl. 
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regulate immigration. This begs the question: if the right to migrate is not 
absolute, how are its limits determined? The third principle is that the medi-
ation of rights must be tied to the universal common good. John Paul II 
utilized the universal common good to define the boundaries of the right to 
migrate when he stated "rights are concretely employed in the concept of 
the universal common good, which includes the whole family of peoples, 
beyond every nationalistic egoism. The right to emigrate must be consid-
ered in this context."25 
Concretely employed, the universal common good implies the follow-
ing about U.S. immigration policy. First, discussions about immigration 
cannot focus exclusively on the costs and benefits of immigration to the 
host country, but must also consider the costs and benefits to the immi-
grants. Second, the right to migrate is strongest for the most poor and vul-
nerable immigrants. Refugees and asylees fleeing dangers of death or 
persecution have the closest thing to an absolute right to migration. Those 
who are fleeing poverty have a strong, but not absolute claim. Those seek-
ing education, or simply a more comfortable life, have a right to migrate, 
but it is weaker than the right of the desperately poor and endangered. 
These principles alone do not determine immigration policy in any 
particular nation-justice requires that the rights of immigrants, however 
strong, be balanced against the human goods at stake in receiving countries. 
There may in fact be few or no burdens on the receiving nation. But, even if 
the burdens are large, they may be outweighed by the rights of the migrants, 
or by the command to welcome the stranger. Whatever the case, the princi-
ples of CST on immigration do not determine policy without reference to 
the particular reality in which electorates and legislators shape policy. 
At this point, some become impatient with CST. If it does not go past 
its general principles to policy prescription, some believe, what good are 
these principles if they do not determine policy? While it is true that CST 
principles leave the citizen and the policymaker with much work to do, they 
are not toothless. John Paul II defends the principles of CST against this 
criticism, asserting its crucial role as a moral framework for analysis: 
The Church has models to present; models that are real and truly 
effective can only arise within the framework of different histori-
cal situations, through the efforts of all those who responsibly 
confront concrete problems in all their social, economic, political, 
and cultural aspects, as these interact with one another. For such a 
task the Church offers her social teaching as an indispensable and 
ideal orientation.26 
25. ld. 
26. Pope John Paul II, Centesimus Annus, No. 43.1, May 1, 1991, availnble at http://www. 
vatican. valholy _fatber/john_pauUi/encyclicals/documentslhfjp-ii_enc_O I 05 199 l_centesimus-
annus_en.html. 
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According to John Paul II, the principles outlined above are not use-
less; instead, they are "indispensable." Of course, they are useless if they do 
not result in concrete realizations of justice, but they make such acts possi-
ble by helping us to think clearly about them. 
The principles of CST on immigration orient the believer toward moral 
policy in two ways. First, anyone who takes these principles seriously can-
not exclude the interests of immigrants from his policy deliberations-a 
country should not only consider the interests of its own citizens when for-
mulating its immigration policy. The interests of its citizens (the nation's 
common good) are relevant but cannot be a comprehensive framework for 
policy. A just nation cannot be completely insular; it must orient itself out-
ward. Second, any policy that restricts the immigration of poor immigrants 
can only be justified because of the very heavy burdens of immigration on 
the host country, since scripture commands a special solicitude toward both 
the poor and the sojourner. 
Thus, CST sharply delimits the debate on immigration, even before it 
is employed. In proclaiming it, the bishops perform a real service for the 
faithful. CST does not determine policy, nor does its proclamation make the 
challenges of prudential policy formulation any less complex. CST does not 
by itself rule out all restrictions on immigration, because judgments about 
the burdens of immigration must take into account the particular challenges 
immigration poses for a particular country at a particular time in its history. 
To turn principle into policy requires the exercise of prudence. 
III. PRUDENCE 
Aristotle defines prudence as "a reasoned and true state of capacity to 
act with regard to human goods."27 It is through the exercise of prudence 
that we make the-good-in-general concretely real in particular circum-
stances. In the political arena, it is through the exercise of prudence that we 
take CST and make policy. In The Four Cardinal Virtues,28 Josef Pieper 
explores the nature of prudence, details the barriers to its full perfection, 
and explains its central importance in the moral life. 
According to Pieper, prudence makes universal goods concrete in par-
ticular circumstances.29 Because the particular contexts in which an individ-
ual seeks to instantiate the good are highly contingent (that is, they are not 
necessary), there is no formula or technique for exercising prudence?O 
Human goods can be realized in different ways and to different degrees in 
particular contexts. Not every good can be realized in every situation, and 
there are trade offs often between the goods that can be realized. 
27. ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1027 (Richard 
McKeon ed., David Ross trans., 1941). 
28. JOSEF PIEPER, THE FOUR CARDINAL VIRTUES (Harcourt, Brace & World 1965) (1954). 
29. [d. at 10. 
30. [d. at 29. 
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Because prudence guides action in a messy, contingent world, one can 
never be as certain about matters of prudence as one can be about theoreti-
cal truths: "The certitude of prudence can never be so great as completely to 
remove all anxiety."31 First principles of moral theology can be known 
more certainly than the implications of those principles in action. People 
may agree about the principles, but disagree about what action to take. 
And because human goods and human perfection become real only 
through prudently considered acts, and each human being is called to the 
responsibility and freedom that prudence makes possible, no person can be 
prudent for another: 
The imperative of prudence is always and in essence a decision 
regarding an action to be performed in the "here and now." By 
their very nature such decisions can be made only by the person 
confronted with the decision. No one can be deputized to make 
them. No one else can make them in his stead. Similarly, no one 
can be deputized to take the responsibility which is the insepara-
ble companion of decision. No one else can assume this burden. 
The strict specificity of ethical action is perceptible only to the 
living experience of the person required to decide.32 
The individual is called to realize the good in those matters which fall 
to him, be they matters of responsible citizenship or of some other sphere of 
action. This call to prudence is part of being a free human subject, and the 
full response to it-embracing the burden and responsibility of acting for 
the good-is crucial to the development of human personality. 
Catholic teaching can guide the prudent person through education in 
general principles. To go beyond this, by offering more detailed guidance, 
is to risk the "non-human" rigidity of casuistry, and to stunt the moral 
growth of the person called to be prudent: 
No matter how much moral theology "goes into details," such 
wisdom alone does not make a man "prudent" .... And any moral 
theology becomes truer and more genuine, and above all more 
capable of dealing with life, the more it expressly renounces such 
a claim. The guarantee of the goodness of concrete moral action 
is given solely by the virtue of prudence. 33 
Pieper makes two points here, each of which is relevant to the specific 
policy guidance the bishops are now giving on immigration. First, to give 
excessively detailed guidance to someone called to exercise prudence can 
rob that person of the moral development that the exercise of prudence 
makes possible. Second, such detailed guidance about the particular appli-
cation of general principles is counterproductive. The "guarantee" of suc-
cess in leavening society with Gospel principles is the virtue of prudence in 
31. [d. at 18. 
32. [d. at 27-28. 
33. [d. at 28. 
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the individuals who act; a society of well-formed, prudent Christians is a 
much stronger foundation on which to build a just society than a society of 
passive parishioners who take their political marching orders from the 
church. 
If this were all Pieper had to say about prudence, his discussion would 
still provide ample ground for the exercise of healthy discretion by bishops 
in the guidance they give their flocks on social policy. Catholics seeking to 
promote justice in society require knowledge of universal principles and 
must instantiate those principles in a variety of concrete circumstances that 
make specific episcopal guidance problematic. A bishop (or bishops' con-
ference) who teaches the laity that CST requires support for this-instead 
of that-piece of legislation crowds out the exercise of prudence by the 
laity. The negotiations and tradeoffs which shape the legislative process, 
and the multitude of tradeoffs facing the Catholic voter, both require pru-
dence. Authoritative teaching about Catholic principles does not by its na-
ture cover the contingent environment in which policy is made. Prudence 
must govern the struggle to realize the principles of CST in society. 
Pieper's discussion of the ways in which prudence can be defective 
offers further insight into the pitfalls of religious guidance on policy. By 
teaching principles of faith and morals, the bishops can claim the special 
grace and guidance promised to the apostles and their successors. When 
bishops venture beyond their teaching office into policy analysis, however, 
there is no guarantee that their teaching charism prepares them for decisions 
that are the responsibility of the laity. 
Pieper outlines how the exercise of prudence can lead one astray. Ac-
cording to Pieper, perfected prudence "looks two ways": perceptively, it 
requires an openness to the real contingencies which frame action, and im-
peratively, it is ordered toward action?4 
Effective action for the good must take real conditions into account; 
prudence must be open to the reality of the world and society. There are 
three elements to this openness. First, the individual must have an honest, 
"true-to-being" memory.35 This is not just a technical capacity to remem-
ber, but the will to remember truthfully. One has only to make this state-
ment to underscore how common false memory, even the will to remember 
falsely, is. Second, prudence must be docile before reality?6 The acting 
person must allow himself to be instructed by reality-must be willing to 
let the truth contradict him. The close-minded know-it-all, who allows him-
self to see only those things that confrrm his preconceived notions and serve 
his political cause, cannot act prudently. Finally, the prudent person must 
be able to confront surprising, unexpected events, and respond appropri-
34. PiEPER, supra note 28, at 11-12 (Harcourt, Brace & World 1965) (1954). 
35. Id. at 15. 
36. Id. at 16. 
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ately.37 Reality often shocks and surprises us, and we must be able to ad-
just to it, not in a panicky or reflexive way, but with measured, nimble 
judgment. 
Although Pieper outlines the barriers to forward-looking prudent ac-
tion, it is those defects in prudence that render the person closed to present 
reality that seem most common in the political arena, where the bishops 
have become active. The ferocious competition that marks the political fray 
in the United States makes openness to reality a mark of a prudent person 
very difficult. Those involved in the constant skirmishes of politics some-
times end up recruiting reality to their cause; instead of "true-to-being" 
memory, they are prone to selective memory; instead of docility, there is an 
unwillingness to let reality contradict their program; instead of nimble ad-
justment to the surprises inherent in any contact with reality, they may spin 
facts to match the party line. 
In light of the nature of prudence and the defects that mar the action of 
prudence, we should not expect that bishops should be immune from the 
pitfalls of prudent action in a politically-charged environment. The next 
section reviews the particulars of U.S. immigration policy, identifying the 
technical and prudential judgments that must be made to turn principle into 
policy. 
IV. TURNING TEACHING INTO IMMIGRATION POLICY: 
FACTS AND JUDGMENTS 
CST insists on the right to migrate, but recognizes that the common 
good of the host country may require restrictions on that right. If our obliga-
tions to provide justice to migrants put the common goods of our society at 
risk-our economic order, our culture, and our security-then our just obli-
gations to our own citizens may force us to curtail the right to migrate. 
Restrictions on migration need not imply denigration of the migrants or of 
the value of migration to them. The benefits of immigration to immi-
grants-the economic benefits of higher pay, remittances, and the potential 
benefits to dysfunctional nations of having an overseas community exper-
ienced in the benefits of a free society-should figure into our policy delib-
erations. If we self-protectively curtail immigration, it is fitting that we do 
so with a sense of regret and reluctance. And, we should not do so lightly, 
without consideration for those who stand to benefit from our generosity. A 
rights perspective allows us to properly balance our generous welcome to 
immigrants against the burdens of immigration. 
The content of immigration policy turns on three judgments. First, 
what are the economic, cultural, and security effects of immigration? Sec-
ond, how should the tradeoffs between the good of immigrants and the good 
of U.S. citizens be weighed? And third, how effective, or ineffective, will 
37. Id. at 17. 
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the various proposals be at regulating the flow of immigration, or in miti-
gating its effects? 
People can and do disagree about each of these judgments. The central 
point of this paper is that bishops should not seek to privilege any particular 
judgment on any of these three points, beyond insisting that the interests of 
immigrants and the poor must be considered, and given appropriate (in my 
view, heavy) weight. 
It is to the "facts" of U.S. immigration that we now turn. After a re-
view of the effects of U.S. immigration, we shall turn our attention to the 
recent document of the U.S. and Mexican bishops, Strangers No Longer,38 
which outlines a plan for immigration reform. The bishops' statement, be-
cause it promotes a political agenda, must embody judgments about the 
particular facts of U.S. immigration, and argue for a specific balance be-
tween immigrant rights and the U.S. common good. Men and women may 
disagree about these judgments; the bishops should be clear that such disa-
greement is not itself a rejection of CST, or evidence of a bias against 
immigrants. 
A. Economic Effects 
Current immigration rates are historically high, even compared to the 
last great wave of immigration at the tum of the last century.39 In 2004 
there were an estimated thirty-six million foreign-born residents in the 
United States (12.3% of the U.S. population).4o Of these, eleven million 
were naturalized citizens, ten million were legal permanent residents, and 
ten million were illegal immigrants.41 The flow of new immigrants into the 
United States peaked in 2001 at 1.5 million per year, and has fallen to just 
above one million per year more recently.42 
For the last ten years, immigration to the United States has become 
increasingly dominated by illegal immigrants-today more immigrants 
enter the country illegally than legally. At least 80% of immigrants from 
Mexico in the last ten years have been illegal.43 Ten years ago there were an 
estimated five million illegal immigrants in the country; that number has 
doubled, to between eleven and twelve million today.44 Immigrants were 
38. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Migration & Refugee Services, Strangers No 
Longer: Together on the Journey of Hope, Jan. 22, 2003, http://www.usccb.org/mrslsttanger. 
shun!. 
39. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES tb1.5 (2006), 
available at http://www.census.gov/prodl2006pubsl07statab/pop.pdf. 
40. JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEw HISPANIC CENTER, UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANTS: NUMBERS AND 
CHARACTERISTICS 3 (2005), available at http://pewhispanic.orglreports/report.php?ReportlD=46. 
41. Id. The rest were refugees, asylees, and other temporary immigrants. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 16. 
44. PANEL ON THE DEMOGRAPHIC & ECON. lMPACTS OF IMMIGRATION, NAT'L REsEARCH 
COUNCIL, Background to Contemporary U.S. Immigration, in THE NEW AMERICANS: ECONOMIC, 
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concentrated in a handful of states in the past, but are becoming more dis-
persed throughout the country.45 
In line with CST's solicitude for the poor migrant, all discussion of the 
effects of immigration should begin with the effect on immigrants. There is 
little doubt that the income benefits to immigrants are substantial, relative 
to their home country income. For example, a Mexican immigrant, working 
full-time at California's minimum wage ($6.75 an hour) earns more than 
twice Mexico's per capita income, and an even larger multiple of Mexico's 
median income.46 Much of the monetary benefit of immigration is sent 
home as remittances.47 
The benefits and costs of immigration for natives fall under three head-
ings: economic, cultural, and security. In the economic realm, both the esti-
mated costs and benefits of immigration to natives are small. The National 
Academy of Sciences estimates that immigration increases the incomes of 
natives by ten billion dollars per year, most of which goes to employers of 
immigrants and to those who buy the goods and services they produce.48 
This seems like a significant monetary benefit until you compare it to an 
eleven trillion dollar economy. Immigration is neither destroying nor en-
riching our economy. Its continuation does not make us particularly rich, 
and its curtailment will not ruin our economy, no matter what it does to 
farming in California, to chicken processing in Arkansas, or to the nanny 
market in New York. The numbers are simply too small to matter much. 
The supposedly alarming estimates· of the net cost of immigration to 
government at all levels are similarly small, although they are trumpeted as 
if they are outrageously high. Careful estimates of the net fiscal cost of 
illegal immigration to the federal budget (not counting the modest benefits 
of immigration to social security) suggest that illegal immigrants impose 
five billion dollars more in costs than they pay in federal taxes.49 Again, 
this seems like a large number, but it must be put in perspective. Five bil-
lion is .2% of the 2.1 trillion dollar federal budget; it is 1 % of the federal 
deficit. The federal government loses five times that amount annually-the 
item in the federal budget for unreconciled transactions was $24.5 billion in 
2003.50 Five billion dollars is not too large a cost to bear; there are other, 
DEMOGRAPIDC, AND FISCAL EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION 20, 51 (James P. Smith & Barry Edmonston 
eds., 1997) (estimating illegal immigration in the mid-1990s)[hereinafter THE NEW AMERICANS]; 
PASSEL, supra note 40, at 3 (recent estimates of illegal immigration). 
45. PASSEL, supra note 40, at 11. 
46. ANDREW YUENGERT, INHABITING THE LAND 28 n. 37 (Gloria L. Zuniga ed .• 2003). 
47. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS STATISTICS YEARBOOK 613 
(2004). 
48. Immigration's Effects on Jobs and Wages: Empirical Evidence, in THE NEW AMERICANS, 
supra note 44, at 220. 
49. Do Immigrants Impose a Net Fiscal Burden? Annual Estimates, in THE NEW AlIiIERICANS, 
supra note 44, at 283. 
50. EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, EcONOMIC REPORT OF THE PREsIDENT 375, tbl.B-78 
(2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/cealerp06.pdf [hereinafter EcONOMIC REPORT]. 
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more alarming costs from illegal immigration than its effect on the federal 
budget. 
The only economic burden from immigration that comes close to being 
significant is borne in California, on the wages of uneducated native work-
ers. The five billion dollar fiscal burden on state and local government in 
California-Medicaid and education costs-is large when compared to the 
state's structural deficit of five billion dollars.51 But even this can be put in 
perspective when compared to total state and local spending in the United 
States, which equal one and a half trillion dollars per year. 52 Because the 
fiscal burden of illegal immigrants is concentrated in a handful of states, 
those states have a strong case for federal help. 
Perhaps the most troubling economic effect of immigration is its mod-
est effect on the wages of unskilled workers. Immigration has decreased 
unskilled wages by at most 3-4% over the last 30 years.53 Although this is a 
small decrease over three decades, it falls on the most vulnerable workers-
those already adversely affected by trade and information technology. Thus, 
it should be troubling to those who care about the native poor, or who place 
native interests above immigrant interests. However, compared to the gains 
to immigrants from immigration-a quintupling of wages for unskilled 
workers from Mexico and tens of billions of dollars sent back to poor Latin 
Americans each year-the losses to unskilled natives are small. Moreover, 
a reduction in immigration will not protect native unskilled workers from 
the effects of free trade and information technology, which have combined 
to account for much of the stagnation in the wages of the unskilled. 
The economics of immigration point to significant benefits to immi-
grants, and insignificant effects on natives. This rules out two arguments: 
that immigrants are necessary to the proper functioning of the U.S. econ-
omy, and that immigrants are taking jobs away from U.S. natives. The eco-
nomic stakes are simply too small to support either of these arguments. 
B. Culture 
Arguments that immigration threatens the common good of the United 
States cannot be based on economic costs and benefits; therefore they must 
appear to threaten culture or security. The cultural stakes, whether they are 
large or small, generate strong emotions that overshadow immigration de-
bates. There seem to be two major cultural concerns. First, are immigrants 
from non-European cultures in some way less suited for healthy democ-
racy? Do they lack the habits-habits of compromise, self-reliance, and as-
51. Kate Folmar, California Faces a $5.5 Billion Budget Deficit Next Year, SAN JOSE MER. 
CURY NEWS, Nov. 15, 2006, available at http://www.mercurynews.comlmldlmercurynews/news/ 
locaVstates/Califomialnorthem3alifomiall6020208.htm. 
52. EcONOMIC REPoRT, supra note 50, at 382, tbl.B-85. 
53. GEORGE J. BORJAS, HEAVEN'S DOOR: IMMIGRATION POLlCY AND THE AMERICAN EcON-
OMY 36 (1999). 
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sociation-that support U.S. institutions? And second, is a multiethnic 
society necessarily prone to division? Is immigration a threat to national 
unity?54 
My expertise is in the economic aspect of immigration, and I do not 
have as much confidence addressing the cultural aspects. Nevertheless, the 
questions that must be answered in ord€r to gauge the effects of immigra-
tion on culture seem clear. 
First, which cultural traits are desirable in immigrants? There has not 
been as much discussion of this question as I would like. Some might argue 
that it does not matter what immigrants are like-that America has success-
fully assimilated immigrants from very different cultures in the past. Never-
theless, if we care about the cultural composition of the immigrant flow, it 
seems strange that we should favor immigrants from white Europe on cul-
tural grounds. Should we really prefer, for example, 100,000 devoutly-secu-
lar, globalistic French over 100,000 religiously-devout Mexicans? Perhaps, 
but there needs to be more discussion about the habits Europeans can bring 
to our democracy. Perhaps devout Mexicans carry more healthy western 
traditions into the United States than do Germans, Brits, and Italians. 
Second, how are recent immigrants assimilating? How should we mea-
sure assimilation? Intermarriage rates and English language adoption have 
in the past been important indicators of assimilation.55 High rates of inter-
marriage played an important role in assimilating the inassimilable Irish, for 
example.56 These rates are generally high for Hispanics (45%), which bodes 
well for their assimilation. 57 Furthermore, how crucial is the English lan-
guage to assimilation? Immigrants who speak or learn English assimilate 
faster economically and culturally.58 New immigrants still adopt the En-
glish language over time, although illegal immigrants are slower. 59 
C. Security and the Rule of Law 
The combination of a surge in illegal immigration and the war on ter-
ror links immigration and national security in many minds. There is a lot of 
confusion about the security stakes in immigration policy. Namely, this 
confusion concerns the ways terrorists enter the country and function within 
it. Although immigration policy debates focus on permanent immigration, 
this kind of immigration is not a threat to national security. Terrorists can 
54. See PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE ABOUT AMERICA'S IMMIGRATION 
DISASTER (1995); PATRICK J. BUCHANAN, THE DEATH OF THE WEST: How DYING POPULATIONS 
AND IMMIGRANT INVASIONS IMPERIL OUR COUNTRY AND CIVlLIZATION (2002). 
55. Social Dimensions of Immigration, in The New Americans, supra note 44, at 369, 376. 
56. Id. at 369. 
57. Id. at 370. 
58. See ROBERT F. SCHOENI, KEVIN F. McCARTHY & GEORGES VERNEZ, Cm. FOR RESEARCH 
ON IMMIGRATION POLICY, THE MIXED EcONOMIC PROGRESS OF IMMIGRANTS (1996). 
59. See Geoffrey Carliner, The Wages and Language Skills of U.S. Immigrants (Nat'l Bureau 
of Beon. Research, Working Paper No. 5763, 1996). 
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enter the United States in many ways-as permanent residents, on school-
ing visas, or as temporary visitors who overstay their visas.60 The crucial 
concern for national security in immigration matters is, then, the scrutiny of 
temporary visitors and their timely exit when their temporary visiting per-
mits expire. Each year, thirty-four million tourists, businessmen, and rela-
tives of U.S. citizens or permanent residents enter the United States from 
many parts of the world.61 Since the United States will not reduce the num-
ber of temporary entry permits, it is likely that terrorists will attempt to 
enter as temporary visitors so long as the federal enforcement mechanisms 
(for screening entrants prior to the approval of their temporary visas and for 
tracking their whereabouts until their visa expires) remain ineffective. 
A discussion of the security stakes in immigration brings to the fore 
the most troubling aspect of our immigration problems-the large numbers 
of illegal immigrants who live among us. The number of illegal immigrants 
has more than doubled in ten years, from five to eleven million.62 Currently, 
more immigrants enter the country illegally than legally.63 
There is a long tradition in western political thought that laws be en-
forced, even to the point of recommending that unenforceable laws not be 
passed and unenforced laws be repealed.64 Laws that are universally ig-
nored tend to undermine respect for the law and corrupt the culture. The 
presence of twelve million or so illegal immigrants in the United States 
corrupts our law enforcement, our politics, and our economy, and under-
mines our ability to protect ourselves from terrorists. This corruption is the 
biggest threat from illegal immigration. 
The corruption begins within the consciences of the illegal immigrants 
themselves. Millions of people are living a lie, pretending that they belong 
here in the United States and have rights here. Their illegal status under-
mines their ability to bargain for better wages, to resist abuses by employ-
ers, and their incentive to learn English and assimilate into U.S. culture. 
megal immigrants are more likely to remain in immigrant enclaves, seeking 
safety in numbers.65 
lllegal immigration corrupts our politics, because it forces us to pre-
tend that laws we have passed democratically are not worth enforcing. llle-
gal immigrants even have their own lobbying groups; some illegal 
immigrants vote, no doubt. Advocates for illegal immigration insist not 
60. STEVEN A. CAMAROTA, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, THE OPEN DOOR: How MILl· 
TANT ISLAMIC TERRORISTS ENTERED AND REMAINED IN THE UNITED STATES, 1993-2001 (2002), 
available at http://www.cis.org/artlclesl2002lPaper211terrorism.htmi. 
61. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION, AND NATURALIZATION SERV., STATISTICAL YEAR· 
BOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, tbl.37 (2000). 
62. PASSEL, supra note 40, at 10. 
63. [d. at 6. 
64. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Part I of the Second Part, q. 96, a. 2 (Mortimer 
Adler ed., William Benton 1952). 
65. See BORJAS, supra note 53. 
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only that we tolerate their illegal presence, but that we pretend that the 
breaking of our laws is a trivial matter, not to be brought up in polite com-
pany. We must pretend that the biggest problem caused by illegal immigra-
tion is the lack of documentation, not illegal status-it is not politically 
correct to call illegal immigrants "illegal immigrants"; we must instead call 
them "undocumented workers." Instead of deporting illegal immigrants, we 
must develop new forms of identification for them-matricular consular 
identification cards instead of passports and special driver's licenses. We 
must treat them like they are legal immigrants and grant them in-state tui-
tion to our public schools. 
Our lack of desire to enforce immigration laws corrupts the immigra-
tion service. Complaints about how awful the old Immigration and Naturali-
zation Services (INS) department used to be, and how it would be 
impossible to enforce immigration laws without a complete overhaul of the 
immigration service are common. Much of the dysfunction at the current 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE, which replaced the INS) is 
due to the impossible task the department was given: to pretend to enforce 
immigration laws while not really enforcing them, and to catch and release 
illegal immigrants.66 Although it is certainly possible to track immigrants in 
the United States better than we do now, the immigration services must 
overcome a legacy of disorganization that stems in part from the contradic-
tory job it was asked to perform. 
The desire to appear to enforce immigration laws while not really en-
forcing them has led to building fences at the border, but not looking for 
illegal immigrants internally within the United States. This lopsided en-
forcement has been counterproductive. Before the era of vigorous border 
enforcement the typical illegal immigrant stayed in the United States for 
about a year, and did not bring his family.67 Migrants cycled into and out of 
the United States. After the border became more difficult to cross, the aver-
age stay in the U.S. lengthened considerably.68 Immigrants who crossed the 
border were less likely to go home, and were more likely to bring their 
families, to settle down, demand driver's licenses and education for their 
children. 
Most importantly, the presence of an underground market for smug-
gling and fake identification cards undermines our security. Drug smug-
gling and human smuggling go hand-in-hand. Terrorists may use the well-
worn illegal entryways, and take advantage of the false identification infra-
structure already in place. 
66. DEPT. OF HOMELAND SECURITY, FAcr SHEET: ICE ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN FISCAL YEAR 
2006. Oct. 30, 2006. available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/Pcl162228690102.shtm. 
67. Sherrie Kossoudji. Playing Cat and Mouse at the U.S.-Mexican Border. 29 DEMOGRAPHY 
159. 162 n.2 (1992). 
68. [d. at 161. 
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It may be that addressing the problem of illegal immigration will solve 
most U.S. immigration problems. To the extent that immigration depresses 
wages, it is most often the wages of legal immigrants.69 The ability to en-
force immigration laws may reinvigorate the immigration service. Legal 
immigrants are more likely to assimilate than illegal immigrants. If there 
are fewer illegal immigrants, and we are not bashful about searching for 
them, there will be fewer ways for terrorists to hide in plain sight. 
Of course, one can accept that illegal immigration is a big problem, 
and suggest different ways of dealing with it. One might eliminate all illegal 
immigration by opening the borders and giving out free green cards, or one 
might actually enforce the laws on the books. Prudent citizens must weigh 
the goods at stake in legalization and enforcement. 
V. THE BISHOPS' REFORM AGENDA 
It is entirely possible for people to disagree with the above analysis of 
the costs and benefits of immigration. Some argue that the costs of immi-
gration to local communities, or to native unskilled workers, are larger than 
I have suggested, or too great to bear. Others may reject my claims that 
illegal immigration undermines respect for the law significantly. 
Those who accept my analysis of the facts may use it to argue for very 
different policies, by weighing the goods of immigrants against the com-
mon good of the United States differently. Some may argue that current 
policies reflect too great a willingness to trade lower, unskilled, native 
wages for greater corporate profits and higher earnings for immigrants. 
Others may argue that the goods of U.S. culture deserve no consideration, 
asserting that they are based on patriarchy and market imperialism. To 
these, the legal chaos caused by illegal immigration may be a positive good, 
a sort of protest which gives impetus to much-needed change in the legal 
system. 
Any disagreement this article generates about immigration reform re-
flects the point of the article: people can disagree about immigration re-
form, even if they share the evaluative framework of CST. When bishops 
clearly teach the evaluative framework, they help us to think carefully about 
the stakes in reform. When they push a concrete program of reform, they 
encroach on our freedom and responsibility to make difficult judgments 
about what should be done. 
Recent teaching documents on immigration highlight the judgments 
necessary to advocate for policy-the sorts of judgments the bishops appear 
to take for granted. In January 2003 the Mexican and U.S. bishops issued a 
joint pastoral on migration between the two countries, "Strangers No 
69. Immigration's Effects on Jobs and Wages: Empirical Evidence, in THE NEW AMERICANS, 
supra note 44, at 223. 
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Longer: Together on the Journey of Hope.'>7O In this document, the bishops 
advocate for a reform of the U.S. immigration system, consisting of wide-
spread legalization of current illegal immigrants, the institution of an 
equally large guest worker program, and for lighter enforcement at the 
border. 7 1 
The assumption throughout the document is that current levels of im-
migration to the United States from Mexico and elsewhere are not a burden, 
and that those who suggest otherwise are xenophobes and racists in need of 
a "conversion of minds and hearts," and "[p]art of the process of conversion 
of minds and hearts deals with confronting attitudes of cultural superiority, 
indifference, and racism; accepting migrants not as foreboding aliens, ter-
rorists, or economic threats, but rather as persons with dignity and rights.'>72 
In section two of the document (a review of CST on migration) the 
bishops introduce a "presumption" about the motives of the 10.5 million 
Mexican immigrants in the U.S.: 
In the current conditions of the world, in which global poverty 
and persecution are rampant, the presumption is that persons must 
migrate in order to support and protect themselves and that na-
tions who are able to receive them should do so whenever possi-
ble. It is through this lens that we assess the current migration 
reality between the United States and Mexico.73 
In this passage the bishops assert that Mexican migrants are all refugees, 
who are fleeing conditions of desperate, life-threatening poverty or persecu-
tion. This blanket assertion is certainly debatable: Mexico's standard of liv-
ing is certainly well below that of the United States, but is comfortably 
above that of desperately poor nations.74 Many Mexicans are very poor, but 
they are not refugees; consequently, their right to migrate is not absolute. 
The bishops begin their policy analysis with a discussion of the root 
causes of migration?' Migration from Mexico to the United States is rooted 
in the large differences in income between the two countries.76 However, 
the bishops fail to mention the widespread corruption and crime in Mexico, 
choosing instead to focus on public programs to create jobs in rural commu-
nities, and joint programs between the United States and Mexican govern-
ments along the border.77 By ignoring the role of corruption in the 
restriction of economic initiative in Mexico, the bishops ignore an impor-
70. U.S. Conf. of Catholic Bishops, supra note 38. 
71. ld. 'I 58. 
72. ld. 'I 40. 
73. Id.139. 
74. United Nations Dev. Programme, Human Dev. Report 2006, Beyond Scarcity: Power, 
Poverty, and the Global Water Crisis (2006), http://hdr.undp.orglhdr2006/pdfs/reportlHDR06-
complete.pdf. 
75. U.S. Conf. of Catholic Bishops, supra note 38. TI 59-62. 
76. ld. 'I 60. 
77. ld. 'I 62. 
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tant barrier to refonn of the Mexican economy and the U.S. immigration 
system. 
The bishops' advocacy for legalization and guest worker programs 
rests on several judgments about immigration policy. First, they assume that 
illegal immigration cannot be controlled; 78 this judgment must in turn rest 
upon two controverted propositions: that illegal immigrants are not deterred 
by enforcement, and that enforcement is too complicated to be carried out 
successfully. They may be correct about this, but certainly people might 
disagree with them, which suggests that the bishops have foreclosed policy 
options. 
Second, the bishops assume that the combination of legalization and 
guest worker programs will reduce illegal immigration substantially. 79 This 
is at least debatable: guest workers are rarely temporary workers, and legali-
zation in the past did not decrease illegal immigration in the United 
States.80 In fact, some argue this combination has increased illegal immi-
gration, by improving the immigrant support network in the United States, 
and by holding out the promise of future legalization for illegal 
immigrants.81 
Finally, by raising concerns about recent steps that make asylum 
claims more difficult in the United States, the bishops ignore the wide-
spread abuse of the asylum system. Every immigrant is assumed to be an 
asylee-in-waiting.82 But, the bishops give no consideration to the high rates 
at which asylee claimants fail to show up for their hearings. 83 
These are just a few of the judgments that are implicit in the bishops' 
advocacy for immigration refonn. People may disagree with the bishops' 
conclusions about the causes of immigration, the effects of legalization, the 
prospects for enforcement, and the problems of asylum abuse. Disagree-
ments about appropriate policy may easily turn on these issues. By using 
their teaching authority to promote concrete refonns, the bishops take for 
granted the prudential judgments necessary to evaluate policy. By framing 
the issues in tenns of conversion and xenophobia, the bishops cast asper-
sions on the faithful who disagree with their policy analysis. 
78. Id.1[ 79. 
79. Id. I[ 76. 
80. See CHRISTIAN JOPPKE, IMMIGRATION AND THE NATION-STATE: THE UNITED STATES, 
GERMANY, AND GREAT BRITAiN (1999). 
81. See BRIMELOW, supra note 54. 
82. U.S. Conf. of Catholic Bishops, supra note 38, TI 92-99. 
83. For a summary of statistics on no-show rates, see Bill Frelick, U.S. Detention of Asylum 
Seekers and Human Rights, MIGRATION POLICY INSTIT1JTE, March 1, 2005, http://www.migration 
information.orglFeature/display.cfm?id=296. Roughly thirty percent of asylum claimants fail to 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
I have made the argument that Catholic bishops and those who work in 
their name should be reluctant to give specific advice about turning CST 
into policy. The principles of CST, which bishops teach with authority, sim-
ply do not alone determine which policies should be enacted to address the 
current challenges of immigration. By telling Catholics that the Gospel de-
mands support for the McCain-Kennedy reforms and opposition to the Sen-
senbrenner-King bill, the bishops are usurping the place of the laity, who 
are called to exercise prudence in applying clearly understood first princi-
ples to messy, chaotic, uncertain environments. 
If bishops took prudence more seriously, they would be more guarded 
in their support for specific legislative action. Their lobbying campaign is a 
violation of the principle of subsidiarity-the principle by which responsi-
bility devolves from higher to lower groups in society. Individual Catholics 
are moral agents, and should be allowed to exercise and develop that 
agency whenever possible. By allowing individual Catholics the freedom to 
make the judgments necessary to apply CST to their local circumstances, 
and in the context of their lives as citizens in a democracy, the Catholic 
Church will more effectively establish justice. 
I argue in this article that the bishops would be prudent to be more 
guarded in their promotion of a political agenda. I do not mean to argue that 
bishops should never make suggestions, or evaluate concrete realities in 
light of CST. It would be impossible for them to speak in purely abstract 
terms about society, and irresponsible for them to be silent in the face of 
laws and social conditions that directly threaten human dignity. First princi-
ples have no real existence apart from concrete circumstance; bishops can-
not avoid reference to concrete circumstance when teaching about 
principles. 
When the bishops suggest policies, however, they ought to include a 
prudent disclaimer that their authority in prudential matters is not 
equivalent to their authority in matters of CST. An excellent example of this 
discretion is "Economic Justice for All," the 1986 Pastoral Letter on the 
U.S. economy.84 In a transition section from a treatment of general princi-
ple to the analysis of particular economic problems, the bishops claim an 
obligation to speak about particulars, but assert no claim to a special author-
ity in teaching about policy: 
This document is not a technical blueprint for economic reform. 
Rather, it is an attempt to foster a serious moral analysis leading 
to a more just economy. 
84. NAT'L CONF. OF CATHOUC BrSFIoPS, EcoNOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL: CATHOUC SOCIAL 
TEACFlING AND TFIE U.S. ECONOMY, TFIIRD DRAFT 37 (U.S. Catholic Conf. Off. of Publ'g and 
Promotion Services 1986). 
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In focusing on some of the central economic issues and choices in 
American life in the light of moral principles, we are aware that 
the movement from principle to policy is complex and difficult 
and that although moral values are essential in determining public 
policies, they do not dictate specific solutions. They must interact 
with empirical data, with historical, social, and political realities, 
and with competing demands on limited resources. The soundness 
of our prudential judgments depends not only on the moral force 
of our principles, but also on the accuracy of our information and 
the validity of our assumptions. 
Our judgments and recommendations on specific economic is-
sues, therefore, do not carry the same moral authority as our state-
ments of universal moral principles and formal church teaching; 
the former are related to circumstances which can change or 
which can be interpreted differently by people of good will. We 
expect and welcome debate on our specific policy recommenda-
tions. Nevertheless, we want our statements on these matters to be 
given serious consideration by Catholics as they determine 
whether their own moral judgments are consistent with the Gos-
pel and with CST.85 
This statement could not be clearer. The bishops must teach the faith, 
and the principles of a just economy, and to do that they often must get 
specific, even to the point of suggesting specific actions. Nevertheless, their 
practical agenda does not carry the same weight as their teaching on princi-
ple. The bishops were clear about this in 1986. I see no such discretion in 
the bishops' blueprint for immigration reform. 
85. [d. 
